Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure

Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the entailing proposition and come to know the entailed proposition. I submit that, on either infallibilist or fallibilist views of evidence, Carter and Pritchard have set the bar for deductive knowledge too low. At the end, I offer an alternative solution. I suggest that the knowledge-retention condition of the closure principle is not satisfied in zebra-like scenarios

Visual Reference and Iconic Content

Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments against representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general lessons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality

Emotional Justification

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties

Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience

Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper of responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is fulfilled by perceptual beliefs. I develop this claim by showing that the doxastic account satisfies a series of intuitive requirements of justification and belief revision

Guarantee and Reflexivity

The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts: Guarantee. Along the way, I will rebut a number of objections and introduce two constraints on how the reflexive rule is implemented

Putting I-Thoughts to Work

A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a better explanation of the integration function than the Millian view. The resulting account can rebut Millikan’s objections and it has broader implications for the debate on the essential indexical

Interacción radiación-materia mediada por fonones en la electrodinámica cuántica de cavidades

En este trabajo de tesis doctoral se realiza un análisis amplio del mecanismo de asistencia fonónica a la interacción en las propiedades ópticas y cuánticas de los principales sistemas de la electrodinámica cuántica de cavidades, a saber, puntos cuánticos verticalmente alineados, un sistema cavidad-punto cuántico y una molécula fotónica acoplada a un punto cuántico. Se encuentra que éste es un mecanismo de decoherencia selectiva que estabiliza desde cortos tiempos las coherencias y afecta la estructura del espacio de Hilbert asociado. Sus efectos sobre los observables del sistema son estudiados a fondo y permiten introducir el régimen de acople intermedio, responsable por varios fenómenos considerados en la literatura hasta la fecha como anómalos. La existencia de éste régimen abre un nuevo panorama de trabajo en la electrodinámica cuántica de cavidades y es además corroborada por medidas experimentales de una molécula fotónica acoplada a un punto cuántico, realizadas en colaboración con el grupo experimental de Finley et al. [1]Abstract: In this Ph.D. thesis it is studied the influence of the phonon-assisted cavity feeding mechanism on the optical and quantum properties of the main systems in the cavity quantum electrodynamics; which are the vertically stacked quantum dots, a quantum dot-cavity system, and a photonic molecule coupled to a quantum dot. It is found that the phonon-assisted cavity feeding is a selective decoherence mechanism, that makes the coherences constant from short times and affects the structure of the associated Hilbert space. Its effects over the system observables are deeply studied and allow to introduce the intermediate quantum coupling regime. This new regime is responsible for many effects that have been considered as anomalous in the literature. The existence of this regime open a new research scenario in the cavity quantum electrodynamics, and it is corroborated by experimental measurements of a photonic molecule coupled to a quantum dot, which was realized in cooperation with the Finley et al. [1] experimental research group.Doctorad

Zonas de Apoyo Logístico Acuático, embarcaciones mayores ZALA

Las Zonas de Apoyo Logístico Acuático (ZALA) se utilizan para armar, desarmar y reacomodar convoyes, previo, durante o después de realizar operaciones de cargue o descargue, y también en algunos casos son usadas para la realización de mantenimientos a embarcaciones -- En diferentes lugares del mundo se usan las zonas de apoyo logístico como China, Holanda, Nigeria y Australia, que son algunos de los países estratégicos para logística; en América sobresalen el Misisipi en Estados Unidos, y la hidrovía Paraná-Paraguay; siendo un complemento para las operaciones fluviales y referente operativo y normativo para la puesta en marcha en Colombia y en especial en el río Magdalena -- En Colombia en lugares como Ciénaga Magdalena, la Bahía de Cartagena y Bahía Colombia en Urabá, se usan zonas para el amarre de convoyes como apoyo para el desarrollo de operaciones fluviales y marítimas, pero sobre el río Magdalena en particular, no existen zonas habilitadas para dicha actividad -- Las iniciativas o proyectos que se adelantan en la actualidad para la recuperación del río Magdalena aún no han contemplado la posibilidad de la habilitación de zonas de apoyo logístico o el establecimiento de las mismas en diferentes lugares del río -- La falta de alternativas para hacer ajustes a los convoyes durante el desarrollo de operaciones de cargue y descargue en buques marítimos o terminales portuarios, incrementa notablemente los costos, riegos e impactos negativos sobre el medio ambient